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1. Introduction
In the 1980s, the Western Pacific hemisphere ranging from Japan
and the PR China to Australia and New Zealand has remained the
growth pole of the world economy. Real per capita incomes of East
and Southeast Asian developing economies grew even faster in this
decade than in the 1970s [World Bank, 1990: Table 1.3] despite major
disturbances in their global environment such as the world-wide
recession in the early 1980s, increasing protectionism in the EC and
the US, large exchange rate fluctuations, high and volatile real
interest rates, and commodity price shocks. The integration into the
international division of labour in manufactures was a driving force
behind the favourable economic performance of Asian-Pacific eco-
nomies in the 1980s. This is reflected in the growing importance of
manufactures and in particular capital goods in their export basket.
In 1988, about 44 per cent of all developing countries' exports
originated from the Asian-Pacific region [World Bank, 1990: Table
14], and Asian NIEs and Near NIEs participated overproportionately
in the expansion of highly income elastic intra-industry trade with
capital goods [GATT, 1989: Table 4].
Japan and the US played a key role in stimulating economic pros-
perity in the Asian-Pacific region. Japan was a major supplier of
capital and technology; the US provided a vast market for manufac-
tured exports and an attractive destination for foreign direct in-
vestment. The question addressed in this paper is whether Japan and
the US will remain catalysts for economic development of the Asian-
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ledged.Pacific region in the 1990s, and which foreign economic policy ini-
tiatives may be necessary by these two countries as well as by the
region as a whole to ensure continued Asian-Pacific leadership in a
changing world economy. Such initiatives are badly needed since the
generally good prospects for the 1990s are overshadowed by a number
of uncertainties and concerns:
Severe trade imbalances of Japan, the US, Germany and some NIEs
have drawn the attention of policy makers to bilateral trade
imbalances. Although nonsensical from an economic point of view,
bilateral trade surpluses and deficits have nonetheless equipped
the protectionist lobbies with seemingly convincing arguments for
more trade intervention, in particular in the US.
It is feared that a failure of the Uruguay Round may pave the way
towards more bilateralism and regionalism in world trade. A simi-
lar danger is associated with the completion of the Single Euro-
pean Market if the EC should attempt to facilitate structural
adjustment in member countries by reducing competition from non-
member countries (fortress Europe).
The collapse of socialism in Eastern Europe could create trade
diversion and a redirection of investment flows to the detriment
of developing Asian economies.
And finally, the Gulf crisis bears uncontrollable risks concern-
ing future oil supplies, its impact on the availability and the
price of capital and the long-term costs of maintaining political
stability in this sensitive part of the world.
These challenges but also the economic potential associated with
European integration and a recovery of Eastern Europe have to be
taken into account when shaping foreign economic policies in Japan
and the US as well as a closer cooperation among Asian-Pacific eco-
nomies. An evaluation of different policy options will be based on
an analysis of the changing economic impact of Japan and the US on
the world economy in the 1980s (Section 2). In Section 3, foreigneconomic policies of the two countries are assessed and some sugges-
tions are derived concerning what Japan and the US can do to support
and stabilise economic development in the Asian-Pacific region and
beyond. Section 4 focuses on cooperation among Asian-Pacific eco-
nomies and the question whether institutional reform is needed to
adequately react to the challenges of the 1990s.
2. The Changing Role of Japan and the US in the World Economy
2.1 The balance of external transactions
It is a well-known fact that the US became the most important
net importer of goods and services as well as of capital in the
1980s while Japan was a major net exporter of goods and financial
capital. A closer look at the respective balance of payments posi-
tions (Table 1) reveals a few interesting changes in the course of
the decade. Trade balances of the US, Japan and other Asia-Pacific
economies reflect the movement of the US-$ exchange rate, however,
with a lag of two years. Trade balances improved in all countries
except the US in the first half of the 1980s when the US currency
appreciated strongly. However, they continued to improve even after
the Plaza Accord in 1985 which marked the beginning of a prolonged
period of a depreciating US currency. The US trade deficit peaked in
1987, and the international realignment of currencies was likewise
changing the trend of trade surpluses or deficits in the other coun-
tries. In addition to Japan, Korea and Taiwan emerged as countries
with trade and current account surpluses in the 1980s while Malaysia
and Thailand remained net importers of capital.
The reversal of the trend in current accounts in 1987 was accom-
panied by a significant shift in the composition of long-term capi-
tal flows. In 1988 (not shown in Table 1) and 1989, the US were able
to attract large amounts of foreign direct investment (FDD in addi-
tion to portfolio investment which used to be almost the only source
of financing the current account deficit prior to 1988. Likewise,Table 1: Balance of Payments Data for Japan, the US and Selected Asia-Pacific Economies, 1980-1989 (in US-S bill.)
1980 1985 1987 1989 1980 1985 1987 1989
US Japan
Current Account
Trade Balance
Long Term Capital Flows
Direct Investment
Portfolio Investment
Short Term Capital Flows
Current Account
Trade Balance
Long Term Capital Flows
Direct Investment
Portfolio Investment
Short Term Capital Flows
Current Account
Trade Balance
Long Term Capital Flows
Direct Investment
Portfolio Investment
Short Term Capital Flows
1.84
25.50
-8.48
-2.30
2.85
27.43
-5.32
-4.38
1.99
-0.01
0.04
3.98
-0.29
2.41
1.02
0.93
-0.01
0.41
-112.75
-122.16
73.42
0.96
64.43
29.86
-143.70
-159.49
32.97
2.69
31.06
51.99
Korea, Rep.
-0.89
-19.00
2.30
0.20
0.98
-0.33
9.85
7.66
-8.47
0.42
-0.11
-0.46
Malaysia
-0.61
3.58
1.58
0.70
0.34
0.35
2.63
5.84
-0.53
0.42
-0.95
-0.99
-105.90
-113.24
76.57
28.99
45.00
12.32
5.16
4.60
-3.90
0.45
-0.03
1.28
-0.15
3.78
0.83
1.85
-0.16
0.30
-10.75
2.13
2.39
-2.11
9.43
16.49
-0.91
0.08
1.08
0.12
0.05
1.13
-2.07
-1.90
2.11
0.19
0.10
-0.06
49.17
55.99
-63.26
-5.81
-41.75
9.73
87.02
96.42
-133.98
-18.35
-91.33
88.61
Taiwan
9.20
11.17
-1.02
0.26
-0.05
-2.14
18.00
20.29
-2.59
0.01
-0.37
12.98
Thailand
-1.54
-1.33
1.64
0.16
0.90
-0.10
-0.37
-0.42
0.60
0.18
0.35
0.46
56.78
77.11
-92.36
-44.91
-32.62
45.81
11.38
16.20
-7.76
-5.35
-0.90
-4.37
-2.46
-2.95
4.25
• 1.65
1.47
2.29
Source: IMF, International Financial Statistics, various issues.Japan and Taiwan, the major long term capital suppliers in the
region, significantly increased the share of FDI in net outflows in
the late 1980s. In fact, Taiwan emerged as a major foreign investor
for the first time in the country's economic history. In Japan, on
the other hand, long term capital outflows were partly offset by a
large annual volume of short-term borrowing.
These observations suggest a number of conclusions on the role
of the US and Japan in the world economy. After stimulating the
expansion of world trade by accepting large and increasing trade
deficits in the first half of the 1980s, the US became more compe-
titive in terms of exports and more attractive for international
risk capital. There are two obvious explanations for this shift.
Firstly, the depreciation of the US currency improved the competi-
tiveness of US exports and rendered goods production in the US more
profitable than exporting to the US. And secondly, FDI inflows to
the US coincide with the resurgence of protectionist thinking in the
US Congress (301 legislation in 1988) and the resulting threat of
increased trade barriers, especially against potent suppliers from
the Asian-Pacific region [for details, see Tucker, 1991].
Japan has increasingly performed the function of international
financial intermediation, lending long and borrowing short [Arndt,
1990]. The shift toward FDI reflects both a changing attitude
towards the US and new prospects associated with the EC decision to
establish a common market by 1993 which was launched with the EC
White Paper in 1985 and ratified with the Single European Act in
1987. As in the case of the US, the perceived threat of increasing
EC protectionism to facilitate structural adjustment towards a com-
mon market is likely to have stimulated Japanese investment and that
of other advanced Asian-Pacific economies in the EC as a replacement
for exports. This raises the question to which extent developments
in the US and Japan have weakened or strengthened Asia-Pacific eco-
nomic integration.2.2 The direction of trade and capital flows
Export flows by destination (Table 2) sharply mirror exchange
rate changes. Until the mid-1980s, Japanese (and EC) exports to the
US increased steeply at the expense of exports to developing coun-
tries (including those in Asia) and the EC. In 1985, 37.6 per cent
of total Japanese exports went to the US, compared to about 14 per
cent to Europe (EC and EFTA) and almost 26 per cent to developing
Asian countries. The US had focused exports much more on Europe
which accounted for a bit over 25 per cent of the total. The shares
of Japan and developing Asia were 10.5 and about 13 per cent, re-
spectively.
The regional pattern of export destinations altered signifi-
cantly with the currency realignment and the approach to the Euro-
pean Single Market. Japan's exports to the US market declined, and
the country exported more to the EC and the EFTA while trade with
the group of developing countries declined throughout the 1980s.
Comparing 1980 and 1989, Japan exported more to industrialised coun-
tries with the US and Europe as prime targets, accounting for 34 and
20.4 per cent of total 1989 exports, respectively. However, this
trend did not loosen Japanese trade relations with other Asian eco-
nomies which also gained in importance both as export destination
and source of imports (bottom part of Table 2).
Concerning the US, the share of exports to Japan and Europe
increased after 1985, and so did the share of exports to developing
Asia. In terms of trade directions, the US obviously reduced their
Atlantic engagement (i.e. trade with the EC and the EFTA) in favour
of trade relations with the Pacific in the 1980s. Exports to Europe
amounting to almost 30 per cent of the total in 1980 declined to
roughly 27 per cent, but exports to Japan and developing Asia in-
creased from 22 per cent in 1980 to almost 28 per cent in 1989. This
trend is even more pronounced when sources of imports are considered
(bottom of Table 2) where Asia and Japan accounted for 39 per cent
of total US imports in 1989 (up from slightly over 26 per cent in
1980) while the share of Europe increased from 19 per cent in 1980Table 2: Inter Regional Trade Flows - Exports and Imports, 1980-1989 (in per cent of total trade)
Exports of
to
USA
Japan
EC-12
EFI'A
CMEA
DCs
Asia
South .Asia
ASEAN
PR Cliina
XIEs
Imports of
fran
USA
Japan
EC-12
ETTA
CMEA
DCs
.Asia
South Asia
ASESX
PR China
NIEs
1980
9.5
3.1
42.7
8.2
3.4
26.0
7.5
0.9
2.7
1.1
2.8
1980
. 10.3
4.6
37.0
6.5
3.0
31.8
7.6
0.5
3.6
0.6
2.7
1985
16.7
3.-1
39.0
7.1
2.7
23.0
8.9
1.1
2.4
2.0
3.4
1985
10.7
8.1
37.0
6.5
2.7
26.6
9.7
0.7
3.4
1.1
4.6
CHCD-Total
1987
14.8
3.4
44.1
8.3
2.2
19.8
8.7
1.0
2.3
1.2
4.2
CBCD-Total
1987
9.6
8.4
42.8
7.5
O 1
22.6
11.3
0.7
2.9
1.2
6.4
1988
13.9
4.0
44.2
8.0
2.2
20.8
9.8
0.9
2.6
1.3
5.0
1988
10.4
8.1
42.6
7.6
1 1
01 0
10.7
0.6
3.0
1.4
5.7
1989
12.9
4.0
47.3
7.6
2.2
19.4
9.1
0.8
2.8
1.0
4.5
1989
11.1
7.6
43.7
7.1
2.1
21.7
10.2
0.6
3.1
1.5 .
5.0
1980
5.5
1.0
55.4
10.9
3.4
20.0
3.0
0.8
1.1
0.4
0.8
1980
8.3
2.6
48.6
8.0
3.6
24.5
3.5
0.5
1.2
0.4
1.5
1985
10.1
1.2
54.7
10.0
2.8
17.5
4.1
1.0
1.2
0.8
1.1
1985
8.0
3.4
52.5
9.0
3.7
19.9
3.8
0.6
1.2
0.4
1.5
EC-12
1987
8.7
1.6
58.7
10.9
2.3
14.3
4.1
1.0
1.1
0.7
1.4
EC-12
1987
7.0
4.4
58.0
9.8
2.8
15.1
4.9
0.6
1.3
0.6
2.4
1988
7.9
1.9
59.5
10.7
2.3
12.5
4.5
0.9
1.2
0.6
1.7
1988
7.4
4.5
58.1
9.8
2.6
12.5
5.0
0.6
1.3
0.8
2.4
1989
7.7
2.1
62.5
9.7
o n
13.0
3.9
0.7
1.2
0.5
1.5
1989
8.9
4.7
58.5
8.9
2.5
14.0
5.6
0.5
2.1
0.7
2.2
1980
9.6
26.2
3.1
1.8
39.6
12.4
1.2
4.1
1.8
5.2
1980
13.1
15.8
3.2
0.6
49.5
13.2
0.6
5.3
0.5
6.8
1985
10.5
22.7
2.5
1.6
35.1
13.1
1.3
3.7
1.8
6.1
1985
20.2
19.9
3.1
0.6
36.0
17.0
0.9
4.4
1.2
10.5
US
1987
11.0
23.4
2.5
0.9
33.2
13.6
1.0
3.9
1.4
7.3
US
1987
20.9
20.0
3.1
0.5
37.5
20.0
1.0
4.3
1.6
13.2
1988
11.9
23.4
2.6
1.2
34.7
14.8
1.1
4.0
1.6
8.0
1988
20.4
19.3
' 3.1
0.5
37.2
20.0
0.8
4.7
1.9
12.6
1989
12.3
23.8
3.1
1.5
34.6
15.5
1.0
4.4
1.6
8.6
1989
19.8
18.0
3.0
0.4
38.8
19.2
0.8
4.5
2.5
11.4
1980
24.4
13.9
2.5
2.8
50.9
27.5
1.7
10.1
3.9
11.8
1980
17.5
5.8
1.2
1.5
64.9
25.7
0.9
17.5
3.1
4.2
1985
37.6
11.9
1.9
39.6
25.9
1.8
6.4
7.1
10.6
1985
20.3
6.9
1.6
1.2
59.6
28.1
1.4
15.1
5.1
6.5
Japan
1987
36.8
16.6
3.1
1.4
36.5
26.6
1.6
6.8
3.6
14.6
Japan
1987
21.7
11.9
2.3
1.6
52.3
31.4
1.5
13.4
5.1
11.5
1988
34.1
17.8
3.2
1.5
37.8
28.5
1.2
8.1
3.6
15.7
1988
22.6
12.9
3.2
1.8
48.3
30.0
1.3
11.4
5.3
12.1
1989
34.0
17.5
2.9
1.4
38.1
29.4
1.1
9.4
3.1
15.8
1989
23.0
13.4
3.2
1.8
47.9
29.7
1.2
11.7
5.3
11.5
.VOTE: EC-12 - Belgium, Luxembourg, Denmark, France, FRG, Greece, Ireland, Italy, Netherlands, Portugal, Spain, UK;
Poland, CSFR, Hungary, Romania, Bulgaria.
EFTA = Austria, Finland, Iceland, Norway, Sweden, Switzerland; CMEA - USSR, CDR,
Source: OECD, Foreign Trade by Comrodities, Series C, Paris, various issues. - EUROSTAT, Foreign Trade Statistics, Countries by Products, Hicrofishes SCE - 2311. - OECD, .Monthly Statistics of Foreign
Trade, October 1990, Department of Economic and Statistics.to merely 21 per cent in 1989. The loosers were the debt-ridden
Latinamerican countries (not shown in Table 2) which suffered from
significantly declining market shares in the US.
The data presented in Table 2 indicate a trend toward closer
economic interaction among industrialised countries at the expense
of developing countries. This tendency was even stronger when the
regional pattern of FDI is considered. Alworth and Turner [1990:
Table 6] showed that the share of developing countries in total FDI
flows declined from an average of 31.2 per cent in 1980-1984 to only
6.8 per cent in 1989. Data from major home countries of foreign
investors (Table 3) support this finding. In particular Japan (and
the UK) has focused on the US and the EC as the most important des-
tinations for FDI in the 1980s while US investors increased their
already substantial engagement in the EC and almost doubled their
FDI stocks in Japan. It is noteworthy, though, that the Asian share
in US FDI did also increase in the 1980s and Asia remained the se-
cond most important destination for Japanese foreign investors.
The evidence reviewed so far does not lend much support to the
conventional wisdom of the emergence of trading blocs in the world
economy. Trade and investment flows rather suggest the development
of closer economic links between the major industrialised countries
with Asian developing countries becoming increasingly integrated
into the division of labour among industrialised countries. This
conclusion does not only apply to the economic exchange between
these countries and Japan or the US but also to Europe. The EC re-
mained the second most important market for East and Southeast Asian
exports to OECD countries in general and for manufactured exports in
particular (Table 4). If there is a missing link, it is the insuffi-
cient presence of European investors in Asia-Pacific [Hiemenz, Lang-
hammer et al., 1987].
Independent of this general finding it has to be acknowledged
that Japan developed from a regional to an international economic
power in the 1980s without significantly loosening ties with the
region. The US, on the other hand, became a very important coun-Table 3: FDI Stocks by Home and Host Countries/Regions, 1980 and 1988 (in per cent)
World
Industrialised Countries
US
Japan
EC-12
Developing Countries
Asia
South Asia
ASEAN
PR China
NIEs
1980
100.0
73.6
2.9
37.4
24.7
3.8
0.2
2.2
1.4
US
1988
100.0
75.1
5.2
38.7
23.5
5.5
0.1
3.0
2.4
1980
100.0
45.7
24.8
11.1
53.8
27.0
0.1
19.6
0.1
7.3
Japan
1988
100.0
61.4
38.8
15.0
38.5
17.3
0.1
10.0
1.1
6.1
Germany
1980
100.0
82.8
20.9
1.3
36.8
17.1
2.1
0.3
1.2
0.6
, FR
1988
100.0
89.1
29.8
2.1
39.6
12.4
2.2
0.3
1.0
0.1
0.8
1981
a
100.0
57.2
28.0
0.7
20.7
21.8
8.3
1.5
3.9
2.9
UK
1987
100.0
84.0
35.3
1.1
27.9
16.0
5.6
0.6
2.8
2.2
Excluding oil companies, banks and insurance companies. - Sum of South Asia, ASEAN, PR China, NIEs.
Source: Die Kapitalverflechtung der Unternehmen mit dem Ausland nach Landern und wirtschaftszweigen, Beilage zu
"Statistische Beiheft zu den Monatsberichten der Deutschen Bundesbank", Reihe 3, Zahlungsbilanzstatistik,
various issues. - Business Monitor, Census of overseas assets, Central Statistical Office, a publication of
• the Government of Statistical Service, various issues. - US, Department of Commerce, Survey of Current
Business, various issues. - Japan, Ministry of Finance, Zaisei Kingu Tokei Geppo (Monetary and Financial
Statistics Monthly), various issues.Table 4: Regional Distribution of Developing Countries' Exports to CECD Countries, 1980-1989 (in per cent of total exports)
Exports to
from
Developing countries
Asia
South Asia
ASEAN
PR China
NIEs
1980
43.0
26.2
51.2
18.4
30.8
30.3
1985
36.0
18.6
38.9
17.4
20.2
16.1
BC-12
1987
34.7
22.6
42.4
22.6
26.3
19.6
1988
30.0
24.9
52.1
23.3
28.8
21.9
1989
36.6
30.8
46.9
39.2
27.6
24.9
1980
28.3"
31.6
21.5
26.5
13.0
44.7
1985
35.4
45.7
35.4
33.4
28.8
60.4
US
1987 1988
Total Exports
38.4
41.3
31.9
33.8
31.1
47.7
36.0
40.0
28.2
33.7
29.8
47.1
1989
35.1
37.0
27.2
28.8
33.0
44.3
1980
20.7
34.6
17.7
49.0
48.5
15.5
1985
20.8
26.8
18.2
41.3
44.2,
13.2
Japan
1987
18.5
22.4
17.1
36.7
33.2
14.4
1988
19.9
25.6
19.5
34.5
34.5
19.3
1989
19.3
25.4
18.2
33.3
30.7
19.9
Exports of Manufactures
Developing countries
Asia
South Asia
ASEAN
PR China
NIEs
39.1
35.0
55.3
33.3
40.1
32.1
24.9
21.0
41.4
25.2
25.3
17.3
29.2
26.3
46.0
29.0
29.2
23.3
43.8
43.8
26.9
48.2
20.9
47.4
58.2
59.9
40.1
60.0
41.2
64.0
52.0
52.7
34.9
54.1
41.1
55.8
8.
10.
6.
8.
24.
10.
9
8
8
7
5
7.2
8.9
9.3
6.8
22.5
7.7
9.0
11.0
9.4
8.9
17.9
10.7
NOTE: Manufactures = SITC 5 + 6 + 7 + 8 without 67 + 68; EC-12 = Belgium, Luxembourg, Denmark, France, FRG, Greece, Ireland, Italy, Netherlands, Portugal, Spain, UK;
EFTA = Austria, Finland, Iceland, Norway, Sweden, Switzerland; CMEA = USSR, GDR, Poland, CSFR, Hungary, Romania, Bulgaria.
Source: OECD, Foreign Trade by Conmadities, Series C, Paris, various issues. - EUROSTAT, Foreign Trade Statistics,Countries by Products, Microfiche SCE-2311. -
Monthly Statistics of Foreign Trade, October 1990, Department of Economics and Statistics.
OECD,11
terpart in the Asian-Pacific division of labour without sacrificing
economic interests across the Atlantic. This proves once more that
participation in world trade and international capital markets is
not a zero-sum game where intensified economic relations with one
region automatically reduce the importance of others.
2.3 Japan, the US, and Asia-Pacific integration
The preceding analysis suggests a changing role of Japan and the
US in Asian-Pacific integration in the 1980s. In the first half of
the decade, regional economic development was enhanced because the
US provided the markets for a rapid expansion of manufactured ex-
ports and Japan acted as a financial intermediary for the whole
region and in particular the US. Export dependence on the US lessen-
ed in the second half of the decade in favour of closer trade ties
to Japan (and the EC). An additional stimulus was derived from a
deepening subdivision of labour within the region. High income
growth, the realignment of exchange rates, China's open door policy,
and restructuring of Asian economies had provided new opportunities
for intra-regional specialisation which led to rapidly expanding
trade between Asian NIEs and Japan, among the NIEs themselves, and
between NIEs and Southeast Asian countries [Kwan, 1990: 60 sqq.;
ADO, 1990: 30 sqq.]. Trade expansion was facilitated and encouraged
by a North-South migration of capital which contributed to the glo-
balisation of production within the region and to more intra-
industry trade in manufactures [e.g. Langhammer, 1989].
In the 1990s, Asian-Pacific economies should be able to benefit
from the greater regional dispersion of external economic relations
achieved in the past decade. Expanding intra-regional trade and
increasing exports to Europe provide a buffer for declining export
opportunities in US markets. In the short term, slackening demand
due to the US recession can be balanced by the still robust growth
performance of Japan and many European economies. In the medium
term, an intensified globalisation of production with partners from
both within and beyond the region offers chances for continued
trade-driven economic development. Such chances will, however, not12
be exploited automatically. Japan has only recently become a major
market for manufactured exports; there are strong protectionist
sentiments in the US; and trade barriers among developing Asian
countries are still high. The question is, therefore, which policy
actions are required by Japan and the US as well as possibly the
Asian-Pacific community as a whole to reap the potential benefits of
closer trade integration. First clues in the latter respect can be
derived from an analysis of economic integration in Asia-Pacific as
it has emerged in the past decade.
The Kiel Institute of World Economics has undertaken a series of
studies on the development and determinants of economic subregions
in Asia-Pacific covering the 1981-1987 period. Economic subregions
were defined as comprising countries with above-average bilateral
trade relations. Hierarchical cluster analysis shows that three such
subregions can be identified [Amelung, 1990a]. The four ASEAN coun-
tries Indonesia, Malaysia, Singapore, and Thailand; a North-Pacific
group including the PR China, Hong Kong, South Korea, Taiwan as well
as Japan and the US; and Australia, New Zealand, and Papua New
Guinea as a third economic subregion. In this latter case trade
integration was definitely stimulated by the Australia-New Zealand
free trade agreement concluded in 1965. Institutional integration
could also have played an important role for intensified trade rela-
tions among the four ASEAN countries while North-Pacific integration
must have been driven by market forces and unilateral policy changes
such as the opening up of the PR China and trade liberalisation in
Japan, Korea, and Taiwan.
This experience suggests that institutional arrangements are not
a necessary precondition for trade integration. A closer scrutinity
of ASEAN shows, furthermore, that progress in mutual trade relations
was not achieved due to trade preferences or industrial cooperation
but to other factors [Langhammer, Hiemenz, 1990: 54 sqq.]. Tariff
preferences did not play a significant role in intra-ASEAN trade,
and it is very unlikely that this will change in the future. This
assessment is first witnessed by the fact that no regular statis-
tical record on the amount of intra-ASEAN trade receiving prefer-13
ences exists. An approximate information referring to intra-regional
exports supported by rules-of-origin certificates suggests that this
trade had amounted to only US $ 45 mill. in 1982 [Chng, 1985:
p. 33], that is 1 per cent of total intra-ASEAN non-oil exports. The
overwhelming part of intra-ASEAN trade occurs either in primary
commodities not eligible for preferential treatment, or in entrepot
trade, or in manufactures which do not meet rules of origin require-
ments [Rieger, 1985]. This is hardly surprising since it is doubtful
whether tariff barriers are really an important impediment to intra-
ASEAN trade. Recent empirical evidence has supported the view that
there is much water in legal tariff rates [Langhammer, 1988] and
that NTBs are looked upon as the more relevant obstacles to trade by
ASEAN traders [Sanchez, 1987].
Institutional integration in a wider sense has, nonetheless,
contributed to the expansion of intra-ASEAN trade. ASEAN member
countries shared common views on the principles of a division of
labour between the private and the public sector. Basically, all
ASEAN member countries are efficiency-oriented and perceive market
forces as the driving element of development [Hughes, 1989]. This
common approach to economic policy making made integration bene-
ficial in at least two respects. First, ASEAN member countries have
established a strong internal network of consultations and software
cooperation without surrendering national sovereignty in major eco-
nomic policies. Software cooperation, e.g. in science and technolo-
gy, culture and information, social development, and sectoral poli-
cies, is institutionally channelled through respective ASEAN commit-
tees and has received increasing attention in recent years [ASEAN,
1988]. This network contributed to lower costs of information for
trading partners and made national policies more predictable for
neighbouring countries. And secondly, ASEAN countries spoke with one
voice in foreign policy matters and in international economic nego-
tiations. As a group, they are engaged in a permanent dialogue with
the major OECD countries on market accessibility and achieved some
success in raising their collective bargaining power, e.g. in nego-
tiations with the EC on the Generalised System of Preferences (GSP)
and the Multi Fibre Agreement (MFA) [Langhammer, 1985].14
Analyses on the determinants of trade integration suggest that
the ASEAN experience can be generalised in so far as intensive trade
relations do not only depend on differences in factor endowments,
transportation costs and trade barriers, but on total transaction
costs associated with importing or exporting to/from a particular
partner country [Amelung, 1990b]. Transaction costs essentially
comprise procurement of information, marketing, payments modalities,
and a risk element. These costs are lower in the case of well estab-
lished trading partners than for new markets; among culturally homo-
genuous groups than for inter-cultural.relationships; and when ex-
change rates to not fluctuate heavily between countries. Further-
more, transaction costs depend on the stage of integration of the
services' sector and in particular the ease with which capital can
be transferred across borders [Langhammer, 1991] . In the ASEAN
group, transaction costs were lowered through the emergence of
Singapore as a regional trading and services center and the software
cooperation among member countries. In the North-Pacific it was
unilateral policy action such as the partial liberalisation of goods
and services trade which served the same purpose of reducing trans-
action costs and thereby stimulating trade integration. These find-
ings contain the important lesson that trade expansion depends on a
wide range of interlinked influences and not just on discriminatory
trade preferences. This should be taken into account when designing
foreign economic policies in the Asian-Pacific region.
3. Foreign Economic Policy of Japan and the US in the 1990s
Forecasts of economic development in the 1990s confirm continued
Asian-Pacific leadership in the world economy (Table 5). Both World
Bank and Nomura projections suggest that Japan and the US can expand
economic activities at a pace comparable to the 1980s while per
capita income growth in the developing Asian countries is likely to
slow down a bit on average, but to remain by far in excess of eco-
nomic growth in other regions of the world. On the whole, the Nomura
Research Institute is considerably more optimistic about future
prospects for economic growth in Asia-Pacific than the World Bank,15
Table 5: Growth of Real Per Capita Income, 1980-2000 (in per cent per year)
Region
World
Industrialised countries
Japan
US
Developing countries
East and Southeast Asia
Asian NIEs
ASEAN
6
PR China
^Projections. - W = World Bank
South Korea, Taiwan, Hong Kong,
Annual average rate of growth
1980-1989 1990-2000
a
W
b N
C W
b N
C
2.5
2.3
6.7
8.7
. -
 CN
Singapore
3.0
4.3
2.8
8.3
5.0
8.3
2.6
3.2
5.1
5.4
= Nomura Research Institute
Excluding Singapore.
3.2
4.0
2.5
7.3
7.1
7.6
Source: World Bank, 1990: Table 1.3; Kwan, 1990: Table 1.
but both estimates rest on the assumptions that Japan can increas-
ingly absorb exports from the region to balance trade frictions with
the US while the intra-regional division of labour intensifies
[World Bank, 1990: 18; Kwan, 1990: Figure 1 and p. 68]. The subse-
quent sections attempt to assess the validity of these assumptions
and to highlight some foreign economic policy actions that may be
required to promote Asian-Pacific integration.16
3.1 Unilateral policy initiatives - Japan
In the 1980s, the main preoccupation of Japanese foreign eco-
nomic policy was placed on the evasion and relaxation of trade con-
flicts with industrialised countries, in particular the US [for
details, see Yamazawa, Hirata, Urata, 1991]. In dealing with these
conflicts, the stance of Japanese government appears to have been
fluctuating between bilateral and multilateral solutions, perhaps in
response to the demands of the US counterpart. In the various volun-
tary export restraint negotiations, for example, agreements were
reached clearly bilaterally, although they do not openly violate
GATT rules. The semi-conductor arrangement under the market oriented
sector specific (MOSS) talks is an interesting example, in which the
Japanese government is believed to have conceded a share of 20 per
cent to the United States in the countries' domestic market.
However, the main measures of Japan to cope with the situation
have been import liberalisation and easier market access under the
most favoured nation (MFN) principle. The liberalisation efforts
through reductions of tariffs and relaxation of import controls
including import procedures have been by no means marginal. Struc-
tural change in the Japanese economy also contributed to lessen
trade imbalance. A clear shift towards more emphasis on domestic
consumption was observed. Together with the rapid and large appre-
ciation of the yen since 1985, imports, especially manufactured
imports started to grow faster than exports. The import/GDP ratio in
constant prices showed a steady increase in the second half of the
1980s, but was still much lower than in other industrialised coun-
tries, especially with respect to manufactured imports [5.5 per cent
in 1988 compared to an OECD average of 21.5 per cent (1987); Yama-
zawa, Hirata, Urata, 1991: Table 4]. Import expansion has mainly
benefitted Asian NIEs and to some degree also the PR China.
Japan's import regime in the formal sense is one of the most
open among industrialised countries. The number of quantitative re-
strictions is small and declining, although there still remain tight
controls on some agricultural commodities. Tariff rates are also17
generally low, especially on manufactured imports. The main trade
barriers appear to arise from structural impediments and institu-
tional arrangements as is evident from the SII talks between Japan
and the US.
The distribution system in Japan is often pointed out as an
import impediment. Statistical evidence suggests that productivity
and efficiency of Japan's wholesale and retail outlets are at a
level comparable to most industrialised countries, in spite of their
multi-layered features. Some aspects of the distribution system are,
however, undoubtedly limiting imports. First, 'keiretsu' or company
groups favour local producers of parts and components over overseas
suppliers. And secondly, the 'Large-Scale Retail Store Law
1 is a
clear institutional trade barrier, under which establishment and
enlargement of department stores and supermarkets are controled.
Since large stores are instrumental in increasing imports of con-
sumer goods, tight entry regulations inevitably work against import
expansion.
Trade policies specifically aimed at developing countries are
few in Japan, with the Generalized System of Preferences (GSP) as
the only major exception. Japan does not participate in any regional
free trade areas or extends special trade preferences to any group
of countries. However, some policies, by their nature or coverage,
affect developing countries more than other countries. Tariff dis-
crimination between rather homogenous products (e.g. coniferous and
tropical plywood) and tariff escalation led to trade conflicts. Yet,
such conflicts were mainly caused by structural reasons, namely the
one-way dependence of Asian developing countries on imports of capi-
tal and intermediate goods from Japan. Growth of production in these
countries tends to induce imports from Japan, while Japan depends on
these countries primarily with respect to natural resources. As a
consequence, economic development is likely to bring about larger
imports from Japan than exports to Japan. The Korean bilateral trade
deficit vis-a-vis Japan increased rather than decreased despite the
rapid yen appreciation, although the exchange rate change largely
contributed to Korea's overall export expansion because of its ef-
fect on strengthening the Korean price-competitiveness.18
These observations suggest a number of unilateral initiatives
which the Japanese government can take to support trade expansion
and economic development in the Asian-Pacific region. There is ob-
viously scope for liberalising trade in agricultural products, a
dismantling of tariff discrimination and escalation, as well as some
improvements of the GSP [Yamazawa, 1988] . In addition, the govern-
ment should not abide to newly emerging protectionist demands. In-
dustries with declining competitiveness, textiles in particular,
have been feeling the pressure of imports from developing countries.
Quantitative import restrictions under the umbrella of the MFA are
strongly advocated. To date, the Japanese government has only con-
ceded minimal protection, but the voluntary export restraint agree-
ment on knitwears with Korea may prove to be the forerunner of fur-
ther protectionist moves.
More important promotion measures do, however, not relate to
trade policies but to the removal of structural and institutional
impediments. Continued adjustment of industrial production struc-
tures to changing comparative advantages, increased competition in
the distribution system, and a relaxation of zoning regulations top
the agenda, although none of these measures are likely to have a
short-term effect on import growth. Therefore, it would be a dange-
rous illusion to believe that Japanese markets could assume a loco-
motive function for continued export-led growth of the whole Asia-
Pacific region. To sustain the past growth record, the region will
not only have to maintain but to intensify trade relations with
other regions in the world, in particular Europe.
Japan will have to play an important role in this process.
Having turned from a predominantly regional to an international
power, Japan can serve as a catalyst for a further 'internationali-
sation
1 of the whole region. As far as financial markets are con-
cerned, the country has already acted as an international financial
intermediary. Likewise, it was shown that Japanese FDI is no longer
biased in favour of neighbouring countries in the region but spreads
more evenly across developing and industrialised regions. This glo-
balisation of Japanese financial and investment activities provides19
an international network of information and services which other
countries of the region can tap to reduce their transaction costs in
trade relations with partners both inside and outside the region. On
the basis of her own experience, Japan can also offer assistance to
neighbouring countries on how to promote the globalisation of their
international relations. Some institutional and other preconditions
for facilitating such a cooperation among Asian-Pacific economies
will be discussed in Section 4.
3.2 Unilateral policy initiatives - the US
The US trade policy stance is characterised by a two-track ap-
proach. While the US administration emphasises MFN treatment in
multilateral negotiations, the US trade act has always contained a
bias towards bilateralism. This inclination to solve trade conflicts
on a bilateral or plurilateral basis became stronger in the 1980s
when the trade balance deteriorated and bilateral trade deficits
attracted the attention of policy makers. The 1988 trade act with
its sharpened section 301 legislation puts pressure on the executive
branch to vigorously pursue bilateral negotiations to liberalise
foreign markets supported by threats of trade sanctions [for de-
tails, see Tucker, 1991: Chapter 5). Although such negotiations were
actually started with only three countries (Japan, Brazil, India),
the legislation has induced a number of other countries such as
Korea and Taiwan to grant unilateral concessions in order to escape
an identification under section 301.
Another aspect of bilateralism inherent in US trade promotion
policies concerns the membership in actually implemented or envisag-
ed free trade areas (FTA). The US-Canada FTA with its planned exten-
sion to Mexico and the Caribbean Basin Initiative (CBI) suggests an
attempt to create a North American trading bloc as a countervailing
force to European integration. President Bush's Enterprise of the
Americas Initiative launched in July 1990, appears to be a further
step in this direction. It invites Latinamerican countries to enter
into bilateral negotiations with the US concerning trade preferences
up to the level of FTA, liberalisation of capital and investment20
flows and solutions for debt problems. The underlying rationale of
all these preferential arrangements is to promote US exports al-
though it has to be acknowledged that partner countries can benefit
from easier access to US markets and from an inflow of US capital.
Such benefits must, however, remain limited since most partner coun-
tries were covered by the GSP, and US FDI focused on industrialised
rather than on developing countries as was shown above.
The multilateral aspect of US trade policies includes primarily
the push towards a liberalisation of trade in agricultural products
and services in the framework of the Uruguay Round as well as the
attempt to include TRIPS and TRIMS in the GATT code. At the same
time, the US has increasingly protected domestic producers against
foreign competition. In addition to the long-standing agricultural
protectionism and trade restrictions under the umbrella of the MFA,
new non-tariff barriers were erected against imports of e.g. steel,
passenger cars, machine tools, footwear, and semiconductors. Many of
these barriers were specifically targeted against exporters from
developing countries in Asia [Tucker, 1991: Chapter 3].
From an economic viewpoint, the two-track approach of the US
appears to be inconsistent and doubtful. Trade and investment agree-
ments with economically rather weak partners on the American conti-
nent are likely to create more trade diversion than trade expansion.
The highly indebted countries of this region will hardly be able to
absorb a substantially larger volume of US exports for many years to
come even if some alleviation of their debt burden could be negoti-
ated. Furthermore, the US runs the danger of invalidating their own
GATT initiatives because bilateral arrangements raise suspicion
among other negotiating parties about the true intentions of the US.
And finally, rapid economic growth in the Asian-Pacific region pro-
vides a much more promising market for US exports, and it would make
more economic sense for the US to actively engage in improving mar-
ket access in this region [for a similar reasoning, see Krause,
1990: 15].
In terms of policy conclusions, the above observations suggest
that it would be in the best self-interest of the US to reduce trade21
frictions by domestic adjustment rather than by a network of trade
preferences. Domestic adjustment does not only mean a reduction of
the budget deficit which makes the US dependent on unsustainable
capital inflows, but also an adjustment of production structures to
improve the international competitiveness of US exports in all for-
eign markets. Concerning trade negotiations, the multilateral ap-
proach appears as more credible and more promising and should,
therefore, dominate trade related policy initiatives of the US in
the 1990s. A stronger push towards world-wide trade liberalisation
should be supported by a unilateral liberalisation of US import
markets which would in turn facilitate structural adjustment and
reduce the incentive to circumvent entry barriers by foreign direct
investment. Such a basic foreign economic policy orientation would,
however, not preclude a closer economic cooperation with Asian-
Pacific economies with the aim of reducing transaction costs for
trade in both directions. In particular Japan, but also the NIEs and
ASEAN, can become important partners in multilateral negotiations if
the region and the US succeed to resolve mutual trade disputes in an
MFN fashion, i.e. without resorting to preferential agreements or
bilateral economic pressure. Most importantly, the US has to seek
agreement with Japan over bilateral trade frictions so that both
countries can join forces against perceived protectionist threats in
Europe and elsewhere. Continued growth of demand which would provide
the scope for expanding US manufactured exports requires improved
trade relations among all partners and not just on a bilateral
basis.
4. Asia-Pacific Integration in the 1990s
If economic cooperation can further Asian-Pacific leadership in
the world economy questions arise concerning the substance and the
form of this cooperation. There are a number of regional cooperation
bodies which differ in focus and country coverage [for details, see
Kim, 1990], such as the Pacific Economic Cooperation Conference
(PECC), the Pacific Basin Economic Council (PBEC) and the Asia-
Pacific Economic Cooperation Conference (APEC). The most recent22
offspring of the desire to enhance regional economic integration
concerns Malaysia's far-reaching proposal to form an East Asian
Economic Grouping (EAEG). This proposal envisages the establishment
of a regional trading bloc, i.e. an East Asian FTA, 'to counter the
emergence of protectionism and regionalism in world trade' as Prime
Minister Mahathir pointed out.
It remains a mystery how regionalism can be defeated by regiona-
lism and why a stronger inward-orientation of the Asian-Pacific
region should be an economically viable alternative to the present
integration into the international division of labour. The lessons
from the ASEAN experience as well as from countless other attempts
to forge preferential trading arrangements among developing coun-
tries are clear-cut [Langhammer, Hiemenz, 1990: Part E): If member
countries of trade integration schemes have achieved sustained eco-
nomic growth and social development they were successful not because
but in spite of trade integration which has at best promoted trade
diversion and a prolonged process of inefficient regional import
substitution. In most integration schemes, however, trade preferen-
ces were either not actually implemented or covered only an insig-
nificant part of intra-regional trade as in the ASEAN case. There
are many external and internal reasons for the failure of regional
trading schemes, but the empirical evidence suggests on balance that
the perceived benefits of trade integration among partners with
widely differing levels of development were too small to encourage
especially the economically weaker partners to open up their mar-
kets .
Against this background, the formation of a discriminatory trad-
ing bloc cannot be recommended for the Asian-Pacific region [for a
similar conclusion, see Chen, 1990, and Drysdale, 1990], Continued
rapid economic growth requires a further globalisation of production
on the basis of structural adjustment in individual economies as
well as global market access. Insofar, there is a high degree of
consistency between regional and international economic policy ob-
jectives. To achieve these objectives, intra-regional economic ties
would have to be strengthened and the extra-regional negotiating23
power enhanced. It is suggested, therefore, that Asian-Pacific eco-
nomies form a liberalisation club with Japan and the US serving as
catalysts for intra-regional and international policy coordination.
Such a club should - in contrast to APEC - comprise at least all
major countries of the region, in particular the PR China, and it
should be open to new members from within (such as Vietnam and other
former communist countries) and outside the region (e.g. in Latin-
america). The club would provide a lively example of the huge bene-
fits a free flow of goods and factor of production across borders
can generate and, thus, invite imitation and participation by other
countries.
The rationale behind this proposal is built on past experience.
Market integration and specialisation within the region and with
other regions can be promoted by reducing transaction costs. Promis-
ing avenues are an improved flow of information among countries,
increased transparency of economic policy making, lower barriers of
access to goods and capital markets, as well as a dialogue about
macro-economic policies .to reduce exchange rate fluctuations. At the
practical level, there is plenty of scope for joint policy initia-
tives to improve the framework for regional integration through
market forces. Concerning information, regional telecommunication
networks need to be expanded and the economic data base enlarged,
particularly with respect to capital and investment flows. To faci-
litate these flows, capital market regulations should be dismantled
and investment approvals harmonised. Furthermore, the less developed
countries of the region could cooperate in human resource develop-
ment and the provision of adequate educational facilities. Another
area for cooperation is related to securing the energy supply for
the countries in the region, and there is also a need to develop
joint environmental policies so that economic progress does not
disrupt the ecological balance or destroy marine resources. And
finally, consultative mechanisms should be developed through which
governments increase the transparency of their monetary and exchange
rate policies and discuss trade liberalisation measures.
Many of these issues are already on the agenda of APEC [APEC,
1990] or other regional institutions. Given the wide range of dif-24
ferent topics and the varying relevance of different topics for
individual countries, it does neither appear necessary nor advisable
to set up a comprehensive regional institution comparable to the EC.
Any such attempt would consume a lot of time and energy which could
be put to better use. when targeted at solving actual regional prob-
lems. Rather, countries should get together in problem-oriented
working parties which are open to all countries interested in co-
operating. In this respect, Japan and the US can play a pivotal role
by initiating and supporting such working parties.
Regional economic cooperation should, however, not be limited to
intra-regional issues; it should include consultations about the
negotiating stance of the region in multilateral economic negotia-
tions. A united and firm opposition of the Asian-Pacific economies
against a resurgence of protectionism can be a powerful safeguard
against an erosion of an open international trading and investment
environment. Both, the European integration and the collapse of
socialism in Eastern Europe open up tremendous trade and investment
opportunities [Hiemenz, 1991] which can hardly be exploited if the
region does not close ranks with the US and increasingly assumes
responsibility for maintaining a liberal world trading system. This
does not only apply to the current GATT negotiations but also to
other international institutions such as IMF, World Bank or OECD. To
serve this purpose, Japan should extend the leadership role the
country has already assumed e.g. in the Asian Development Bank or
the OECD to other international economic policy bodies such as the
IMF and the World Bank. And secondly, as the NIEs catch up they
cannot expect to hold on to developing country status, either in
bilateral or multilateral negotiations. It is now widely recognised
that the GATT did great harm to developing countries by excusing
them from the normal responsibilities of GATT membership. For the
NIEs, the GSP probably had a negative impact because of the high
administrative costs for the government and private firms. There-
fore, graduation within the GATT and the International Monetary Fund
framework has now become a major issue for the NIEs. This might be
followed by entry into the OECD with concomitant adherence to OECD
rules of conduct. Such a stance would cap the remarkable progress of
the NIEs and strengthen the international impact of Asian-Pacific
economies.25
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